A large-scale supply-chain attack has been carried out through Optimizely, which provides A/B testing and experimentation services for websites. According to reports by StepSecurity and Ecosistema Startup, based on findings by security researcher Scott Helme and the company Report URI, the attacker planted malicious code on 16 November in the “Project JavaScript” field of Optimizely Web customers’ projects. Because the code was served from Optimizely’s own content delivery network (cdn.optimizely.com) with a valid certificate, it ran directly in the browsers of visitors to the affected sites.
The researchers found that 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets they could access contained malicious code, and that these belonged to 178 organisations. They stress that the real number may be higher, because only the snippets that could be found were examined.
Which sites were affected?
According to the reports, the affected organisations include well-known names such as CNN, BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, KLM, Air France, IKEA, Equifax and the crypto wallet maker Ledger. By sector, banking and finance tops the list with 32 organisations, followed by technology and software services (23), retail (20), streaming platforms (12) and news and media (10). Optimizely’s own website and login page also carried the malicious loader.
There is an important distinction here: these organisations’ own servers were not compromised. The attacker got inside a third-party service these sites use. In this method, known as a supply-chain attack, breaking into a single provider makes it possible to reach hundreds of sites that use that provider at the same time.
What did the malicious code do?
According to StepSecurity’s analysis, the roughly 30 KB script combined several functions. The first was a crypto address swapper: it replaced Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron, TON, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses with the attacker’s addresses in page text, forms, clipboard content and network requests. The second was a card skimmer: it captured the card number, expiry date and security code entered in payment forms. According to the researchers, this feature was added at 13:43 UTC on 16 November. It could not reach card details entered inside the payment provider’s own frame (iframe).
The script also sent screenshots of the page and cookies without security flags to the attacker. There was a separate branch for iPhone and iPad visitors: on older iOS versions, pages that researchers linked to known exploit kits were loaded through a hidden frame. However, no successful device compromise has been confirmed.
How long did the attack last, and what was the damage?
According to the timeline, the first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on 16 November. Mass cleanup began between 20:40 and 21:10 UTC that evening, and Helme reported at 23:11 UTC that all files were clean. The attacker’s wallets are estimated to have received around $7,040 in cryptocurrency over about nine hours. However, because stolen card data and cookies leave no on-chain trace, the researchers stress that the real damage may be greater than this figure. They also warned that browser caches could keep the malicious script running for up to 24 hours after cleanup.
What did Optimizely say?
According to StepSecurity, Optimizely confirmed the incident and said on its status page that an unauthorised party had exploited a vulnerability in its experimentation product to inject JavaScript into some customer projects. The company said the flaw was in the account signup flow and has been fixed, and that it had removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked access tokens and notified all affected customers. It has not yet explained how a flaw in the signup flow gave write access to unrelated projects. Salesforce said it was investigating unauthorised changes and had disabled Optimizely scripts.
What should users and site owners do?
According to the researchers’ recommendations, people who entered card details on these sites on 16 November should monitor their account activity and, if necessary, ask their bank for a replacement card; those who made crypto transfers should re-verify the recipient address on their wallet device’s screen. iPhone and iPad users are advised to update to the latest iOS version. Site owners, for their part, should inventory all third-party scripts, read the custom JavaScript fields in their Optimizely projects one by one, remove unrecognised users and access tokens, and tighten their Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict script and connection addresses. Of the 256 sites Report URI examined, 68 had no CSP at all; only 15% were able to block the malicious payload.
What does this mean?
The incident clearly shows that the security of modern websites depends not only on their own code but also on the dozens of third-party services they use. A single flaw at one provider can put visitors to hundreds of organisations, from banks to news sites, at risk on the same day. According to the researchers, similar poisoning attempts have also been seen in other analytics and marketing scripts in recent weeks. For this reason, reducing third-party tags, especially on payment pages, and strict security policies are no longer an option for organisations but a necessity.
This report was compiled as of 18 November 2026, 09:00 Türkiye time; follow developments as they are updated.
This report is for general information only and is not financial or legal advice. If you suspect your card or account was affected, contact your bank or service provider directly.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Optimizely attack?
On 16 November malicious JavaScript was planted in Optimizely Web customers’ projects; the code reached visitors to the sites of 178 organisations through Optimizely’s delivery network.
What data was targeted?
The malicious code swapped crypto wallet addresses and stole card details from payment forms and some cookies.
What should I do?
If you entered card details on affected sites on 16 November, monitor your account activity and replace the card if needed; keep your devices updated.
Sources and further reading
- StepSecurity, “OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Compromise (Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer)”, 17 November 2026.
- Ecosistema Startup, “Optimizely: malware a 178 webs, incluidos Zoom y GitLab” (based on Report URI findings), 17 November 2026.
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